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President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” 
nearly 40 years ago and established the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
to combat illicit drug use on the streets of 
the United States (Thirty years of America’s 
drug war: A chronology). In 2008 the 
Bush administration continued this war 
on drugs with the Merida Initiative, a 
policy focusing on drug production and 
US-Mexico border security. The Obama 
administration has expanded this initiative 
(US State Department). The Merida 
Initiative is the US government’s effort to 
combat “drug trafficking, organized crime, 
corruption, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering and the demand for drugs 
in both the U.S. and Mexico” (Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, 2013, p. 
65). This study addresses the question of 
whether the Merida Initiative has resulted 
in lower rates of violent crime along the 
US-Mexico border.
There are a variety of viewpoints on this 
topic in the existing literature. According 
to US government sources, the US and 
Mexico have made great strides in reducing 
border violence. The US Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) 
doubled the number of its agents along 
the US-Mexico border in 2009 (Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, 2013, pp. 
2-6). In addition, ICE has increased the 
number of border liaison officers that work 
with Mexican law enforcement officials on 
drug trafficking issues. The US government 
claims to have reduced the flow of money 
that supports Transnational Criminal 
Organizations (TCOs), hindered the trade 
in illegal weapons across the border, and 
improved safety in border communities 
including the reduction of violent crime 
(Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
2013, pp. 2-6).
However, according to local news sources, 
the violence is still a concern for many 
citizens who live along the border. County 
officials in Douglas, Arizona say that 
violence is ongoing in their region and 
spreading eastward (Bell, 2013). They 
note the disappearance of the Mexican 
police chief in Nuevo Laredo in 2011. In 
a town hall meeting with the citizens of 
Douglas, consul officials from both the 
US and Mexico admitted there was some 
violence along the border but that anyone 
not associated with the drug trade should 
be safe. When the consul officials tried 
to talk about economic prospects, the 
audience kept returning to the topic of 
border violence (Bell, 2013). According to 
another local reporter, a Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) official attributes the rise 
of border violence in the El Paso region 
to the friction between the Sinaloa cartel 
and its rivals (Valdez, 2013). These news 
reports suggest that people who live along 
the border continue to be very concerned 
about drug-related violence, as do some US 
government officials who work there.
However, researchers and law enforcement 
personnel need to be careful in attributing 
a causal relationship between the Merida 
Initiative, the drug trade, and border 
violence. There are correlations to be 
made between the ongoing drug violence 
in Mexico and the violence along the 
border. This does not solely mean that the 
violence has crossed into the US. In a 2013 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
report, researcher Kristin Finklea suggests it 
is not very easy to figure out levels of border 
violence, nor is it easy to prove that violence 
is linked to drug trafficking (Finklea, 2013 
p.16). She questions the US government’s 
claim that it has reduced “spillover” violence 
along the US-Mexican border as some 
people suggest, (Finklea, 2013, pp.1-21).
The RAND Corporation, an independent 
public policy think tank, is equally critical 
of the Merida Initiative but for different 
reasons. Rand analysts criticize the lack of 
coordination between the US and Mexican 
agencies and worry that the lack could 
worsen relations between the two countries 
(Schaefer, , Bahney & Riley, 2009, pp. 
45-54). This book also addresses some 
of the United States’ shortcomings when 
looking at how they support the Mexican 
government and fighting to reduce violence 
along the border. One shortcoming seen 
by the RAND Corporation is the way 
in which the Merida Initiative does not 
fill holes between local and federal police 
agencies and that local level police receive 
no further assistance than before the 
Merida Initiative (Schaefer et al., 2009, pp. 
45-54). 
According to political scientist Peter 
Andreas (2009) the federal government’s 
“out of control” narrative has exaggerated 
the violence along the border, which has 
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convinced Congress to turn over more and 
more resources to increase border security. 
The US has built larger and larger barriers 
that have been more symbolic than useful 
in securing the border. This narrative is 
that of a state (US) losing the ability to 
manage movement and violence along an 
international border. This perceived loss of 
control gives state officials a pretext to rely 
more on coercive policies to curb violence 
and regain control of the border.
Andreas points out the reactions that the 
state is taking (e.g., increased policing, 
larger barriers) which glosses over the 
actual reasons why there needs to be 
increased policing. What they are glossing 
over in terms of stricter laws, expansion 
of agencies and rising agency budgets is 
that the US-Mexican border has never 
been secure. Therefore, the whole idea of 
cooperation between the US and Mexico is 
what Andreas calls “image crafting instead 
of management crafting the border.” This 
notion of image crafting does not depend 
upon levels of enforcement but the way 
in which the enforcement is perceived 
(Andreas, 2009, pp. 4-10). 
The Organization of American States 
(OAS) issued a comprehensive report 
on the state of anti-narcotic efforts in 
the western hemisphere. Though this 
international organization supported the 
US’s “war on drugs in the past, it now 
calls for different policies. Around 7,000 
homicides were reported in Mexico that 
were drug related in 2010” (Organization 
of American States Secretary General, 
2013, p.7). The OAS has collaborated 
with academics and world leaders to try 
and get control of drug trafficking. In 
doing this the OAS tried to come up with 
policy solutions but found that a lot of 
Latin American states do not have the 
money to put into polices that will help 
combat drug trafficking in their countries 
(Organization of American States Secretary 
General, 2013, pp.5-9, 77). This latest 
report does not give any clear cut evidence 
that violence is directly on the border, but 
it implies that the initiative is not doing 
as well as Mexican officials had hoped in 
reducing the root causes of the drug trade 
which are organized crime, corruption, 
illicit arms trafficking, money laundering 
and the demand for drugs in both the 
U.S. and Mexico (Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, 2013, p. 65). My 
research seeks to focus on the US side of 
the border rather than the Mexican side, 
but the number of homicides from the 
OAS could indicate the previous scenario 
that “spillover” is a possibility along the 
border. The problem of identifying and 
measuring border violence due to drug 
trafficking and its relationship to the 
Merida Initiative are very complex as 
seen through this previous literature. My 
question is has the 2008 Merida Initiative, 
a joint US-Mexican policy on trafficking in 
illicit drugs, increased US border security? 
More specifically, has the Initiative reduced 
drug trafficking violence on the US side of 
the border? I hypothesize that the violent 
crime has decreased but not to the extent 
that the US government claims, nor can we 
determine with certainty that the decrease 
is the result of the Merida Initiative.
To test my hypothesis, I examined the 
rate of violent crime in the four border 
states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and Texas, from 1990 to 2013, available 
from the US Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009; 
US Department of Justice, FBI) crime 
statistics. I also reviewed assessments of the 
Merida Initiative by Congress, the Office 
of National Drug Control Policy, and 
non-governmental organizations (e.g., the 
Center for International Policy). If there 
is a dramatic drop in violent crime since 
2008 along the border than my hypothesis 
is wrong. If not, then my hypothesis has 
support as long as this drop in violent 
crime is not attributable to the Merida 
Initiative. I would spin the hypothesis 
in a positive way: The first part of the 
hypothesis is correct if there has been no 
dramatic drop in violent crime rates along 
the border. The second part is correct if 
there is no consensus among a variety of 
experts regarding the relationship between 
the Merida Initiative and violent crime rate 
patterns.
The year 1990 is the baseline for 
comparison. In that year, President George 
H. W. Bush proposed a dramatic increase 
in spending on the “war on drugs,” and the 
following year, the DEA’s budget increased 
by 33% and continued to climb thereafter. 
Starting in 1990 also gives us two decades 
of data—ample enough to provide possible 
patterns as I will look at global figures for 
the four border states, as well as sixteen 
border counties, with a focus on two 
dissimilar ones. One is El Paso County 
in Texas, which features the interlinked 
cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, and 
has a long history of drug trafficking, 
and Cochise County in Arizona, with the 
small US town of Douglas across from the 
much larger Mexican city of Agua Prieta, 
and where the rise of drug trafficking is 
more recent (Arizona Criminal Justice 
Commission [ACJC], 2011, p.11). I chose 
these two counties since they occupy two 
disparate parts of the US-Mexico border 
and have two different political economies 
and histories. This focus shows whether 
or not I can make a generalized statement 
about the border and drug related violent 
crime levels. I then compared these data 
and government assessments with those of 
non-governmental observers such as the 
Organization of American States, Center 
for International Policy and Witness for 
Peace. 
I gathered qualitative data from a variety 
of governmental and non-governmental 
sources, the latter which run a gamut of 
political orientations. When conducting 
this research we have to keep in mind the 
possible bias from both governmental and 
non-governmental sources. The data which 
I will examine may be highly politicized 
and therefore the results might be prone to 
being exaggerated to show improvement. 
Whereas critics of the “war on drugs” or the 
Initiative may unfairly deflate the results 
as insignificant when there might actually 
be an overall improvement to the problem. 
Secondly, we also have to consider the 
structural factors that contribute to 
violent crime and the “drug trade.” One 
is political, that is, corruption and weak 
state institutions (i.e., police, judicial and 
legislative, etc). Another is social, referring 
to communities wracked by drug cartels 
or rampant emigration, or both. A third is 
economic, namely, the lack of economic 
opportunity. In sum these factors might 
be alleviated greatly if the state institutions 
were stronger and the economy was robust, 
the communities would probably not be 
rampant with emigration or wracked by 
the drug cartels due to better economic and 
enforcement policies in place (Shannon, 
2008). These are factors which cannot be 
examined at an in depth level due to the 
lack of time and resources.
This assessment looked into whether the 
Merida Initiative reduced violent crime 
along the US side of the border. The data 
that was gathered from the FBI shows some 
very interesting trends in violent crime 
along the border. The sixteen counties that 
were examined showed that more violent 
crime activity occurred in Cochise County 
(Arizona) versus El Paso (Texas) over the 
20 year plus time span (See Appendix 
for county level charts). However, the 
Cochise County violent crime rate has 
been fluctuating quite a bit over the years. 
That county’s rate has had drastic ups and 
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downs in terms of the percentage of violent 
crime. In 2008 the violent crime rate did 
drop, but it went back up in 2009 and then 
slid downward over 2010-2012. Looking 
at the border region as a whole it seems 
that violent crime is going down as well. 
There are certain individual counties that 
have spikes in increased violent crime rate 
like Cochise County and Laredo, Texas; 
in addition, the counties in California, 
Imperial and San Diego, had the lowest 
violent crime rate amongst all counties 
examined. Interestingly, all four states have 
border and non-border counties that state 
level data combines. Due to these factors 
at the state levels and variances in violent 
crime rates there cannot be a definitive 
generalization about violent crime along 
the border. We could surmise that 1) the 
Merida Initiative could not be expected to 
be overwhelmingly effective; however, it 
may have been effective in reducing violent 
crime in some but not all border counties, 
and 2) if not for the Merida Initiative, 
the violent crime would have been worse. 
It is difficult to prove that violent crime 
rates and the Merida Initiative are linked 
through data due to the fact that state level 
data collapses county data with state data. 
Obviously not all of a state’s counties are 
on the border, and so the data is skewed a 
bit by the other counties crime data.
The reasons for this reduction in violent 
crime and if it is attributable to the Merida 
Initiative are varied just as we saw before. 
Every report that has been examined in this 
assessment has not connected the Merida 
Initiative to a reduction in violent crime 
along the border. The reason as to why 
there is no connection depends upon who 
is asked. As pointed out by Tom Barry 
(2011) of the Center for International 
Policy (CIP) a left leaning think tank, the 
decrease seen in violent crime along the 
border may be due to the new Southwest 
Counter Narcotics policy of 2009 which 
compliments the Merida Initiative efforts 
to crackdown on the drug cartels. Both of 
these initiatives bolster border security that 
could reduce the rate of violent crime along 
the border. 
This report by CIP also cites the very 
visible display of border security and 
enforcement by the Obama administration. 
The administration’s buildup of security 
might contribute towards the violence seen 
in Mexico, as drug cartels try to control 
their own turfs. In other words, the Merida 
Initiative might actually be making the 
problem of drug cartel violence worse 
in Mexico which, in turn, could make it 
worse for the US at some point. Currently 
for the US side of the border this show of 
strong border security has given renewed 
life to many border towns and cities (Barry, 
2011). As for the Merida Initiative being 
the root cause for this renewed life in 
border towns and cities and strong security 
complex it is uncertain, according to Barry. 
The violence experienced by the Mexican 
side does not seem to be spilling over to 
the US side at this point in time. It should 
be noted that the Obama administration 
has put in place policies and vigorously 
enforced laws that crackdown on drug 
cartels and trafficking (Barry, 2011, pp.9-
11). 
A professor of Military Studies at the US 
Army War College Paul Kan (2012) says 
that the Obama administration was one 
of the first to actually include controlling 
violence along the border and the unstable 
environment in Mexico as a national 
security threat to the US. The Obama 
administration was the first to consider 
border violence and instability in Mexico 
as national security threats. Kan cites lack 
of being able to control the violence on 
the Mexican side of the border as a threat 
to the people of the US and its borders 
combined with the demand from the US 
for drugs as a major problem for the “war 
on drugs.” Basically the US and Mexico 
can implement policies as they have been 
and are doing, but if there is not enough 
coordination the problem of violence along 
the US side of the border and the spillover 
effect will continue. One of the previous 
complaints from the RAND Corporation’s 
analysis of the Merida Initiative was 
its lack of coordination between local 
police forces and the government which 
ultimately makes the problem worse. Kan 
says that if both Mexico and the US want 
to win the “war on drugs” it most likely 
will not be with a military operation. No 
military can beat the supply and demand 
factor of this situation. The reasons for 
the increase in violence in Mexico, Kan 
states, are a combination of institutional 
erosion, NAFTA, party politics, culture and 
machismo, and access to weapons among 
other factors. He argues that taking care 
of just one or two of these problems is not 
going to cure the problem in Mexico or the 
threat to US national security. Each issue 
has to be dealt with individually and that 
one of the larger aspects of taking care of 
the problem is dealing with the subject of 
human rights which the Merida Initiative 
does to a point. Although Kan does not 
directly address the Merida Initiative, his 
study of the US-Mexican partnership on 
the “war on drugs” is relevant. This study 
shows that the Merida Initiative may well 
not be sufficiently comprehensive to win 
the “war on drugs” and reduce border 
violence (Kan, 2012, pp.72-132). 
The NGO Witness for Peace is even more 
strident in its call for more attention to 
the issue of human rights in the “war on 
drugs.” Witness for Peace does not feel 
that US policies have done enough to 
counter police abuses and corruption. They 
also cite the same problem that Kan did 
in that supply and especially demand of 
drugs has to be dealt with. This demand is 
compounded by the fact that there is a lot 
of poverty in Mexico and drug trafficking 
is very profitable. Secondly, Witness for 
Peace echoes the same sentiments that Kan 
did which are that a military operation for 
a situation such as this is destined to fail; it 
cites the Plan for Columbia which allocated 
$5.6 billion to Columbia to combat drugs 
without any success. Currently, the US 
Congress has allocated $1.5 billion from 
2008-2010 for the Merida Initiative to help 
Mexico.
The area of human rights is of a huge 
concern for the group Witness for Peace 
as well. Included in that 1.5 billion dollar 
aid are conditions on human rights that 
have to be met before the aid is given to 
the Mexican Ministry of the Interior. To 
hopefully stop human rights abuses before 
they occur, Congress laid out four criteria 
that must be met before 15% of the Merida 
funds will be given. The criteria are as 
follows: “transparency and accountability 
in law enforcement, civilian trials for 
military officials accused of human rights 
violations, consultation with human rights 
groups, and prohibiting testimony obtained 
through torture” (Witness for Peace, 2011). 
Many citizens in Mexico do not feel that is 
enough to stop the abuses and corruption, 
and some have complained that the Merida 
Initiative gives the Mexican police and 
military more power to disregard their 
human rights. Results of these provisions 
have been slow in coming as of 2010; only 
$26 million was withheld due to the lack 
of human rights oversight by the Mexican 
government (Witness for Peace, 2011).
Even though there have been so many 
critics of the Merida Initiative some still 
believe that it has helped but that the US 
government has a very mixed and murky 
way of dealing with the violent crime 
related to drug cartels along the border. 
Ray Walser (2010), an analyst for the 
conservative Heritage Foundation, thinks 
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the Merida Initiative was a good policy 
move towards controlling the violence in 
Mexico, and thus the violence would not 
spread to US communities as some have 
feared. Without the US backing equipment 
such as x-ray vans, helicopters, armored 
vehicles and better cooperation with 
intelligence gathering, the violence could 
spill over the US border. The intelligence 
gathering aspect is very crucial in deterring 
and detecting drug related violent crime 
and so are the intelligence teams the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) helps Mexico 
put together. These intelligence teams help 
coordinate law enforcement assistance to 
state and local agencies in Mexico. 
However, Walser is also critical of the 
Merida Initiative. Walser’s main issue with 
the Initiative as discussed earlier in my 
findings was the very slow shipment of 
equipment to the Mexican authorities. The 
issue of getting the Mexican authorities 
assistance in time to make an impact 
has also been in the way of getting the 
necessary funds together as concern for 
where the money is going and how it is 
being handled also plague this initiative. 
It is hoped that the new National 
Southwestern Border CounterNarcotics 
Strategy will help offset any gaps that the 
Merida Initiative has in its implementation 
(Walser, 2010). This alone will not help, 
according to Walser who maintains that 
the US has to have strong domestic and 
international policies to counter the drug 
cartels and violence in Mexico (Walser, 
2010). The Merida Initiative seems to have 
been a good start on working on a very 
complex problem with many facets to the 
problem according to this report by the 
Heritage Foundation.
The Congressional Research Service’s 
(CRS) most recent report as cited by 
Finklea on the Merida Initiative maintains 
that the violence has decreased on both 
sides of the border. Throughout the period 
of time the Merida Initiative has been in 
effect around a billion dollars has been 
spent. This notion that violence has gone 
down can be supported by my findings that 
as violent crime as a whole decreased, the 
amount of funding on the Merida Initiative 
has increased. The figure of money being 
spent will only grow as time goes on since 
last year the total was $1.2 billion. With all 
of this money spent and the violent crime 
rate dropping well before the Initiative 
took hold, the actual effectiveness of the 
Initiative is the question.
The US Congress has been gauging 
implementation according to two criteria: 
the number of training opportunities, and 
the rate of delivery of Merida Initiative 
resources and assistance. Even though 
the US has expedited deliveries in recent 
years, this does not necessarily mean 
that the Initiative has been effective (US 
Government Accountability Office). The 
increase in those delivering the needed 
supplies to the Mexican authorities does 
not mean it helped the Merida Initiative 
as my data showed an increase in violent 
crime along the border in 2011 when the 
deliverers were expedited. Before those 
deliveries the violent crime rate was down 
overall. As CRS points out, the positive 
effects of these deliveries and assistance 
in 2011 still does not show whether these 
deliveries made a huge difference or not. 
Another factor that needs to be considered 
is maintenance of the equipment the 
Mexican government receives. The training 
that the Initiative gives to the Mexican 
authorities, according to CRS, shows 
us a turnover rate of police officers after 
receiving training, and the US government 
is not tracking their progress as they should 
be. This way of measuring does not give 
clear or accurate results of whether the 
Merida Initiative is actually reducing the 
violence along the border. Conclusive 
evidence cannot be gained as to whether 
this Initiative has decreased violent crime 
along the US border further since its 
inception. The US government cites the 
amount of extraditions and killing of drug 
trade organization leaders as a sign of the 
achievements of the Merida Initiative. 
Again however, there are many problems 
with measuring the achievements of this 
initiative as is evident from the results of 
this study and the many others that have 
tried to measure Merida’s success (Seelke & 
Finklea, 2014, pp.4-35).
Conclusions that can be drawn from this 
study are that the violent crime along the 
US side of the border has gone down with 
the exception of a couple of counties in 
Arizona and Texas. It is interesting that 
the violent crime rate was going down well 
before the Merida Initiative. This shows 
that proponents of the Merida Initiative 
cannot conclusively give all the credit for 
reducing violence along the border to the 
Merida Initiative. This reduction in crime 
could be due to increased border security 
and enforcement and previous assistance 
given to Mexico as well. The actual results 
of violence spilling over into the US from 
Mexican drug cartels cannot be accurately 
proven based on the evidence available. 
There are various reasons for the variances 
in violent crime rates along the border and 
their relationship to the Merida Initiative. 
They could be due to the lapse in time 
of getting the supplies to the proper 
authorities in Mexico, a continued lack of 
coordination between national and local 
law enforcement, human rights violations, 
emphasis on this being a “war” or the 
aspect of supply and demand that can 
only be controlled in the short-term versus 
long-term situation. Thus far we have seen 
that the Merida Initiative has made limited 
efforts to address the deeper causes of the 
drug trade. One structural cause is political, 
such as weak Mexican state institutions, 
including rampant government corruption. 
There are also social factors, such as 
community bonds weakened by migration 
and the drug trade. Cultural norms 
idealizing the drug trade are another factor.
Greatest of all is the economic factor. 
Relatively few economic opportunities 
outside of narco-trafficking, combined 
with the high demand for drugs in the US, 
make the drug trade a tempting source 
of employment (McCaffrey, 2009). Peter 
Andreas (2009) could give us another 
explanation as to why the recent spike in 
violent crime has occurred. The border was 
never out of control because the US never 
really had control of the border in the first 
place. The many facets of this problem 
make it difficult to assess whether progress 
on the issue at hand has made a difference. 
This whole notion that the border is “out of 
control,” even when violent crime is going 
down, could point to political motivations 
beyond just controlling the drug violence. 
The Merida Initiative may be in part an 
effort to appease a hard-core faction in 
Congress that prefers straightforward police 
and military responses to narco-trafficking 
and border violence rather than far more 
complex comprehensive approaches.
Instead of looking at what should be 
looked at which is the best interest for 
those people living along the border, there 
has been a concentration on fighting and 
winning the war on drugs. Not enough 
concrete data is available to see if even this 
violence that we see is directly linked to the 
drug cartels. The Merida Initiative’s premise 
is that there is a close correlation between 
violent crime along the US-Mexico border, 
and the drug trade. However, there is 
not yet enough data to demonstrate this 
correlation. Unfortunately, US policy 
appears more attached to that perceived 
correlation rather than what is in the best 
interest of people living both sides of that 
border.
44
GVSU McNair Scholars Journal
References
Andreas, P. (2009). Border games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico divide (2nd ed.). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission. (2011). 2008-2011 State strategy drug, gang and violent crime control. Retrieved from http://www.
azcjc.gov/ACJC.Web/Pubs/Home/2008-2011_DGVC_Control_Strategy-Amended.pdf
Barry, T. (2011). Policy on the edge failures of border security and new directions for border control. Retrieved from Center for 
International Policy website: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/publications/Barry_IPR_Policy_Edge_Border_Control_0611.
pdf
Bell, D. (2013, March 13). U.S., Mexican Consulates talk border violence. Douglas Dispatch. Retrieved from http://www.douglasdispatch.
com/news/article_2dbe7359-13b4-5dbb-8ae3-802e1d629050.html.
Finklea, K. M. (2013, February 28). Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence. Retrieved from 
Congressional Research Service website: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41075.pdf . 
Kan, P. R. (2012). Cartels at war: Mexico’s drug-fueled violence and the threat to U. S. national security. Retrieved from http://reader.eblib.
com.ezproxy.gvsu.edu/(S(vzkdhkua2bx45kbgreff3cd2))/Reader.aspx?p=1057782&o=662&u=Am2kFSXttXMCu%2bz 
%2bQ6nl3g%3d%3d&t=1395448442&h=772A895E8A5A18A3D4DD909BE12279E37E034D31&s=21983069.
McCaffrey, B. R. (2009). Narco-violence in Mexico: A growing threat to U.S. security.
       Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.gvsu.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE%7CA193315961&v=2.1&u=lom_
gvalleysu&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1
 Organization of American States. (2013). The drug problem in the Americas. Retrieved from http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/
Introduction_and_Analytical_Report.pdf
Office of National Drug Control Policy. (2013). National southwestern border counternarcotics strategy. Retrieved from Executive Office of 
the President of the United States
       website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and research/southwest_border_strategy_2013.pdf  
Schaefer, A. G., Bahney, B., & Riley, K. J. (2009). Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. policy options [Adobe Digital Editions 
version]. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG876.html.
Seelke, C. R., & Finklea, K. M. (2014). U.S.-Mexican security cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and beyond. Retrieved 
from Congressional Research Service Reports website: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf.
Shannon, T. A. (2008). Merida Initiative. Journal of International Security Assistance Management, 30(1), 27-29. Retrieved from http://
search.proquest.com.ezproxy.gvsu.edu/docview/197771285?accountid=39473
Thirty years of America’s drug war: A chronology. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/
U.S. Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009). UCR offense definitions. Retrieved from Federal Bureau of 
Investigation website: http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2010). Assessing the Merida Initiative: The United States has provided counternarcotics and 
anticrime support but needs better performance measures Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-837 
U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action. (n.d.). Merida initiative. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/.
 Valdez, D. W. (2013, May 23). Experts: Cartel disputes fuel increase in Juárez region violence. El Paso Times. Retrieved from http://www.
lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?oc=00240&hnsd=f&hgn=t&lni=58GH-NVG1-JCB3-432B&hns=t&perma=true&
hv=t&hl=t&csi=270944%2C270077%2C11059%2C8411&secondRedirectIndicator=true 
Walser, R. (2010, April 26). U.S. Strategy against Mexican drug cartels: Flawed and uncertain. Retrieved from The Heritage Foundation 
website: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/04/us-strategy-against-mexican-drug-cartels-flawed-and-uncertain 
Witness for Peace (2011). The Mérida Initiative/Plan Mexico. Retrieved from http://www.witnessforpeace.org/downloads/Witness%20
for%20Peace%20Fact%20Sheet_Merida%20Initiative_2011.pdf
45
Volume 20, 2016
Appendix
Violent Crime Rates in 16 US border counties
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Footnote: Due to lack of data at the county level in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data from the town of 
Luna Deming had to be used in its place.
Footnote: Due to a lack of data at the county level in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) El Paso had to be 
used in place of county level data.
